The Continuous Double Auction (CDA) 
Introduction
The term 'Continuous Double Auction' covers a broad class of trading institutions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and offers. This is as opposed to only buyers shouting offers (as in an English Auction), or only sellers shouting bids (as in a Dutch Auction). Since the CDA is intractible from a Game-Theoretic perspective, experimental methods have long been used to explore the mechanisms behind some of its most curious properties and CDA experiments with human participants have been organized since the early 60's [12] . Agent-based simulations offer us a powerful tool that we can use to study the properties of a CDA using empirical methods. Agent-based methods are not only convenient and economical but also offer a tightly controlled environment in which a diverse range of experiments can be performed. Most stock and commodity markets around the world including those at New York, Tokyo, Frankfurt and Chicago are organized as variants of the basic CDA mechanism, in which there is symmetry between buyers and sellers -the next shout is equally likely to come from either. Some recent work on automated market mechanism design using GAs by Cliff [2, 4] has shown that non-standard variants of the CDA, which are asymmetric with respect to buyers and sellers, and hence are unlike previously known versions, can, in some circumstances, give the most desirable market dynamics. Work by Phelps et al [8] uses a Genetic Programming (GP) based approach to co-evolve a trade-settling formula for the CDA along with the trading algorithm parameters, so as to explore alternatives to the traditional clearing rule. These attempts at automatic market design are particularly relevant in the context of market mechanism design for electronic trading agents. Electronic agents can potentially participate in any kind of auction, and there is nothing that stops us from adopting these 'peculiar' non-standard versions of the CDA for online auction markets, if there are sound economic reasons to do so. However, for wide adoption of these markets we need to conclusively prove that
• automatically designed markets consistently provide larger gains than traditional market mechanisms, and
• these gains are achieved regardless of the trading strategy used.
Previous work has addressed the first of these concerns but has failed to address the second. In this work we have used a self-adaptive Evolutionary Strategy to search through the space of possible auction types described in [2] . This space is parameterized by a real-valued parameter Q s lying in the range [0, 1], corresponding to the likelihood that the next shout will be selected from the pool of agents that wish to sell, as opposed to the pool of agents that wish to buy. This space of mechanisms was first introduced by Cliff [2] and forms the basis for his work in exploring automatic market design [2, 4] .
For the trader agents, we have used the Zero Intelligence Constrained (ZI-C) traders, defined by Gode and Sunder in [7] . ZI-C traders submit random bids subject to the constraint that they cannot shout loss-making offers and specify the lower bound on the cognitive ability that is needed for a trader participating in a CDA. We also incorporate some suggestions made by Preist and van Tol [9] in the definition of the CDA protocol. Our results demonstrate that nonstandard variants of the CDA lead to higher allocative efficiency than traditional variants in many cases. In order to explore the possible reasons for this superiority, we conduct experiments to optimize Q s values over a two-dimensional space of test-markets parameterized by the slopes of the supply and demand curves. We plot three-dimensional landscapes of optimum Q s values for all markets in our test space and discuss possible reasons for the regularities observed. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous work on Q s -based CDAs and puts our work in context. Section 3 describes our experiments, in which we use an ES to find the optimum value of Q s for any market organized as a CDA. In Section 4 we try to investigate what underlying characteristics of a given market could lead to a particular Q s value being optimal. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary of our work and points out some directions in which this work can be extended.
Background Work

ZI-C Traders
Zero Intelligence Constrained (ZI-C) traders were designed by Gode and Sunder [7] to study the lower limit of rationality required to participate in a Double Auction. A ZI-C trader submits, ". . . random bids and offers distributed independently, identically and uniformly over the entire feasible range of prices," subject to a budget-constraint (so that it cannot quote loss-making bids or offers). There are two reasons why we have chosen ZI-C agents for our experiments. Firstly, experimental results obtained with ZI-C trader experiments allow us to make a strong statement about validity and robustness of the result that non-standard markets can be optimal. Favourable results obtained with ZI-C traders indicate that the market mechanism used is incentive-compatible and probably robust to changes in the trading strategy used. Secondly, the original motivation behind the design of the ZI-C agent strategy was to address the assumption, common in economics literature but invalid in practice, that the behaviour of all agents is perfectly rational. Since ZI-Cs represent the lowest end of the rationality spectrum, it follows that any results obtained in ZI-C markets are robust to trader-irrationality. This is a fundamental concern in the field of market-mechanism design, and market-mechanisms that perform well despite trader irrationality are naturally preferred over those mechanisms that deliver high-performance only with perfectly rational traders. The simplicity of the ZI-C trading algorithm, which makes it so appealing, also leads to a large variance in test results. For this reason in all our experiments we have averaged the fitness measurements over many ( 103) market trials. There has been a strong tradition of carrying out market trials in a staggered manner with trading taking place over continuous trading periods or days [3, 2, 4, 7, 12] . The chief motive for this was to allow time for learning and a resulting convergence towards equilibrium price. Since the behaviour of ZI-C traders is uniformly random it does not make sense to use trading days in ZI-C markets.
Persistent Shout Double Auction
In implementing the bidding process we have incorporated two suggestions made independently by Preist and van Tol [9] and Das et al [5] . Preist and van Tol studied a variant of the CDA involving an order-queue, which they termed a persistent shout double auction market. In a CDA with an order-queue a trader's current bid or offer persists until the trader makes another, or is able to execute a trade at that price. Preist and van Tol [9] demonstrate that agents in a persistent shout CDA reach equilibrium much faster, maintain a more stable equilibrium and are more robust to changes in learning rate (for ZIP agents). The second modification is inspired by the New York Stock exchange, in which any new bids or offers must improve on the existing ones. This constraint is commonly referred to as the NYSE rule in trading-agent literature. We have implemented a market that is a CDA with an order-queue and with the additional NYSE rule constraint [9] (p. 6).
Automating Market Design
One way to automate the process of market design is to parameterize the description of a given market type. Once we have a complete parameterization of a space of market mechanisms, the design process can be seen as a parameter optimization problem. This is the methodology used by Cliff in [2] . Cliff had previously used a GA to optimize the parameters for his ZIP trading algorithm in [3] ; in [2] he added a single parameter Q s to the tuple of ZIP initializing parameter values. In an ordinary CDA, any buyer or seller can shout a bid or an offer at any given time. The modification Cliff proposed to this mechanism has to do with choosing a balance between buyer and seller shouts. Q s denotes the probability of the next shout coming from a seller. Thus, in an ordinary CDA Q s = 0.5. Even though it is straightforward to implement this modified mechanism in a computer simulation of a CDA, non-standard values of Q s (i.e. not equal to 1, 0 or 0.5) are unlike any known types of auction markets. Cliff [3] reports that in three tests that he conducted on three different markets M1, M2 and M3, the optimum value of Q s that is evolved using a GA search are 0.0001, 0.07 and 0.16. In a subsequent work [4] , he describes the results on test market in which the supply and demand schedule is changed suddenly between experiments. This is referred to as a market shock and seeks to mirror the occurrence in everyday financial markets of a sudden change in trader preferences, which changes the underlying supply and demand curves significantly. In these experiments M1M2 and M2M1, it was found that the optimal value for Q s (from the point of view of Smith's 'coefficient of convergence' α [12] , which measures speed of equilibration) were 0.25 and 0.45 (statistically indistinguishable from 0.5). However, there are several questions that could be raised about the validity of Cliff's results. Firstly, all experiments were performed with ZIP traders; the exclusive use of the ZIP trading algorithm raises serious questions about the robustness of these results to a change in the trading algorithm used. Secondly, Cliff used Smith's to measure the performance of the market mechanisms being tested, but this does not necessarily mean that the non-standard markets are good with respect to alternative measures. Do Cliff's results generalize well to other fitness measures? In this paper we seek to address both these questions. Firstly, we have used ZI-C traders, which are not only a different trading-algorithm from ZIP but also define the lower bound on rationality required to participate in the CDA. Secondly, we have used allocative efficiency as the measure of market fitness, since we believe it to be more directly linked to the motives behind market design: Faster and more stable convergence do not mean as much to traders as an increase in average profit, or as much to auctioneers as an increase the number of viable trades executed. Allocative efficiency directly reports on the latter (and profit dispersion on the former).
Evolutionary Design Optimization
Algorithm
We have used a self-adaptive Evolutionary Strategy (ES) style approach to design an Evolutionary Algorithm to optimise the value of Q s for a given market. Evolutionary Strategies are the application of the Evolutionary Computation (EC) paradigm to real valued parameter optimisation [11] , [10] . ES were designed to be self-adaptive from inception and studies by Fogel [6] , and Back and Schwefel [1] have shown that an ES with a self-adaptive mutation operator usually perform better than an ES without a selfadaptive operator on the same problems. A general selfadaptive strategy, as outlined by Yao, Liu and Lin [14] , of the following type, is used:
where x is the value being optimized, and η is the standard deviation for Gaussian mutations that will be applied to x. η is known as the strategy parameter.
2. Evaluate the fitness for each individual; the fitness of
, for a fixed objective function f .
3. For each individual (x i , η i ), generate an offspring (x i , η i ) as follows:
where N (0, 1) is a normally distributed random variable, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. τ and τ are commonly set to (2n
4. Calculate the fitness of each offspring (x i , η i ).
5.
From the set of all parents (x i , η i ) and offspring (x i , η i ), select the fittest n individuals to form the next generation.
6. Stop if a halting criterion is satisfied, otherwise go back to step 3.
Our evolutionary algorithm is a direct implementation of this, with Q s substituted for x, initial values for Q s chosen to be uniformly distributed in [0, 1], and using the allocative efficiency of a day's trading as the fitness function f .
Test Cases
The test cases MZIC-I and MZIC-II have 6 buyers and sellers each; the supply and demand curves for each of these markets are shown below in Figures 1 and 2. 
Results
MZIC-I
Even by visual inspection one can observe from Figure 3 that the MZIC-I landscape is strongly asymmetric, and the optimum lies at none of the conventional values of Q s equal to 1, 0 or 0.5.
The η log shown in Figure 4 confirms the predicted behaviour of the self-adaptive ES: the step sizes for successful offspring get smaller and smaller as the ES homes in on the optimal value. Note that the 'step size' η does not give the value of the actual mutation. The actual mutation value is given by η × N (0, 1), where N (0, 1) is a normally distributed random number with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The log for elite Q s values shown in Figure 5 shows the optimum to lie around Q s = 0.2 (This log depicts information averaged over 25 runs). This agrees with the information depicted in the landscape for the problem, which was shown in Figure 3. 
MZIC-II
The landscape for MZIC-II shown in Figure 6 immediately stands out because of its seemingly linear nature and because of the fact that most of the points in the landscape seem to have almost exactly 100% efficiency.
The elite Q s values for all 25 runs, which are shown in Figure 7 , are extremely noisy and show poor convergence due to this highly flat landscape, which behaves like a plateau over which the ES displays an unstable behaviour. However, note that the values are clustered around Q s = 0.2.
A qualitative explanation of why the base-line efficiency in this market is so high can be given as follows. Consider the supply and demand schedule for the MZIC-II problem shown in Figure 2 . The only extra-marginal trader in this market who can reduce efficiency by executing a trade is the seller with reserve price 11. Furthermore, the only buyer he can trade with has a reserve price of 12. Given that this buyer always shouts prices below 12 (distributed uniformly in the [0, 12] interval) and the extra-marginal seller always shouts prices above 11, it is highly unlikely that they will ever trade. Hence, 100% efficiency is achieved in most runs. A full quantitative analysis for calculating this likelihood is hard due the presence of the order queue, as well as the fact that we must consider the actions taken by the other traders. But the qualitative explanation gives us a fair understanding of the reason behind the nature of the landscape.
For cases like MZIC-II, when we amplify the fitness landscape, as depicted in Figure 8 , it is reassuring to find that the underlying trend does seem to peak at around Q s = 0.2 and confirms the result given by the ES.
Gaining Insight into Empirical Results
The methods we have described in the previous section can help us determine the optimum value of Q s for a given market, which can then be used to conduct an auction which offers a high likelihood of making larger gains than previously known auction types like the English, Dutch and Continuous Double Auction. However, our technique requires: 1. A perfect or good knowledge about the nature of the underlying supply and demand curves for the market.
2. Significantly large periods of time (of the order of hours) to conduct an evolutionary search through the space of possible market types.
An argument against the applicability of such a technique is that the underlying supply and demand data for any given market is unknown and moreover, changes dynamically with time. This is a fair criticism and is perfectly applicable to volatile markets in which the underlying supply and demand curves change rapidly. There do exist markets which are relatively stable, and whose nature changes only slowly with time. In these markets it is possible to determine values of Q s that can be used for protracted periods of time. But it would be best if we could determine the optimum Q s value in spite of imperfect supply and demand data and in a relatively short period of time. Evolutionary techniques are probably ill suited for dynamically determining the optimum Q s value in a 'live' market. So in order to be able to determine the optimum Q s in a shorter period of time we need to gain more insight in to the relationship between the optimum Q s value and the underlying supply and demand curves. In this section we present a systematic study of the relationship between supply and demand, and optimal Q s value.
A space of supply-demand environments
We chose to study a two-dimensional space of linear supply and demand curves. The specification of supply and demand is given in terms of the following parameters:
• minP rice: the lowest seller limit price (asks, and hence trades, cannot occur below this price).
• maxP rice: the highest buyer limit price (bids, and hence trades, cannot occur above this price).
• mS: the slope of the supply curve.
• mB: the slope of demand curve.
• nB: number of buyers in the market.
• nS: number of sellers in the market.
To be precise, the i th seller is assigned limit price (min(maxP rice, minP rice + imS); the ith buyer is assigned limit price max(minP rice, maxP rice − i × mB). nS is given by the largest integer (≤ 6) less than (maxP rice − minP rice)/mS, since any seller with limit price maxPrice is constrained to ask prices that no buyer will accept, and hence does not affect trading. Likewise nB is given by the largest integer (≤ 6) less than (maxP rice − minP rice)/mB. The definition of allocative efficiency implies degeneracies in these parameters: if we replace minP rice and maxP rice by minP rice + C and maxP rice + C respectively, then efficiency is not affected; likewise if we multiply maxP rice, minP rice, mS and mB by a fixed positive constant, the same is true. Thus we can fix minPrice and maxPrice to be arbitrary (increasing!) positive numbers. We choose minP rice = 0, maxP rice = 20, and mS, mB are the free parameters.
Gaining Computational leverage
If we vary the slopes through 21 points ([0, 20]) each for mB and mS, we have 441 environments in which to find the optimum Q s value. If we set NO OF GENERATIONS to 500 and run the ES to completion for each of these environments, this experiment would take more than 3 months to perform on a single machine. To gain computational leverage in this large landscaping process we have made some modifications to our ES. These modifications are based on the observations that very often the ES can stagnate (fittest individual is unchanging) much earlier than the maximum number of generations. The basic idea to is to monitor the behaviour of the ES as it optimizes the Q s value for any environment (mB,mS) and terminate its execution if the ES stagnates. We define a parameter MAX STAGNANT and terminate the ES has been stagnant for the last MAX STAGNANT generations. There are two criteria for judging if the ES has stagnated.
Elite Q s value has stagnated.
We can terminate the execution of the ES if the elite Q s value has stagnated as this indicates a likely convergence to the optimum Q s value. We have included a bias in our ES that leads to an offspring replacing a member of the parent population if the fitness of both is equal. So if the elite Q s value has remained constant, this is probably on account of domination of this value over others rather than a random walk by the ES (which can happen in case of flat (or nearly flat) landscapes). Hence, in this case we terminate the ES and report the elite Q s value.
Elite fitness value has stagnated.
The case in which the fitness value stagnates, but the elite Q s value keeps changing is trickier. In environments for which efficiency is almost always 100% (e.g. when the supply and demand curves do not intersect) there is very little difference in fitness between individuals, and the elite Q s can vary greatly from generation to generation. In such cases we have adopted the policy of reporting the average Q s value -which on an average can be expected to be 0.5.
Results
The mB and mS values for this experiment are varied over the interval [0, 20] with an increment of 1. The number of buyers and sellers, nB = nS = 5. Fitness values are averaged over 1,000 trials. MAX STAGNANT has a value of 10 for this experiment.
We observe the following regularities from Figure 10 : 4. We observe that along the mS = mB diagonal in this matrix, there is a consistent trend that which shows the domination of non-standard market types. Interestingly this non-standard Q s region seems to broaden above the mS = 20 − mB diagonal in this matrix of markets.
We now give some qualitative arguments to show that these observed regularities do agree with intuition. Note that repeated experiment results reported elsewhere confirm these trends. For more results and discussion see [15] . When mB = 20, there is only one intra-marginal buyer but many intra-marginal sellers (see Figure 11) ; ensuring high efficiency is a question of ensuring that the buyer with highest reserve price trades with the seller with the lowest cost price. How does a Q s value of 1 help us in achieving this aim? A Q s value of 1 means that only sellers shout offers in the market as the buyers observe silently. This in turn means that sellers are being forced to compete amongst themselves and undercut each other continuously in an effort to steal the only trade that is available in the market. This competitive process leads to the elimination of the efficiency-reducing extra-marginal traders one-by-one as the current-best offer in the market drops below each of their limit (cost) prices. This process continues until only the seller with the lowest reserve price is left in the market. This seller can now trade with the sole intra-marginal buyer generating 100% efficiency. So in this case a Q s value of very close 1 can be seen as an attempt by the mechanism to ensure that by the time a seller is allowed to shout, and hence trade, only the seller with the lowest cost price is permitted by the NYSE rule and order queue to do so -which leads to 100% efficiency. Similar arguments can be made for why a Q s value of 0 is optimal for markets in which the supply slope mS is high.
4.3.2
The non-standard Q s region seems to broaden above the mS = 20 − mB diagonal in this matrix of environments.
Examining the contour plot shown in Figure 10 , we observe that non-standard values of Q s dominate more and more as the value of the equilibrium quantity Q 0 decreases. This is shown by the broadening of the non-standard 'bulge' that can be seen along the mS = mB diagonal. As the value of Q 0 decreases, it becomes increasingly critical to get the only profitable trade available in the market 'right'. Since the efficiency achieved is directly related to the surplus generated in this only transaction, the effect of using Q s as a control parameter is heightened. If we look at Figure 10 again in this light, we observe that the indeed, the non-standard region does seem to broaden as Q 0 decreases. Refer to [10] for details.
Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
The CDA, even though hugely popular, is also little understood, and gaining insight into its properties is important from both an economic and a scientific perspective. CDAs are not only the most common type of auction mechanism in the world, but they also find application in many artificial intelligence problems using the paradigm of Market Based Control [13] . Recent research has shown that the CDA, although difficult to analyze rigorously, lends itself to an experiment-based empirical approach. Our work can be seen as another step in this direction. Cliff had proposed an idea about market design in which the bidding process could be regulated by a parameter Q s -our work is an attempt to investigate this idea thoroughly and determine whether it has potential for wide application in actual marketplaces. Our results show that non-standard variants of the CDA are superior to conventional mechanisms for many of our test cases. These are the first-ever results that demonstrate that non-standard markets can dominate conventional variants with more than one type of trading algorithm. More research is needed to prove that these results hold for all types of trading strategies and perhaps even human traders. More research is also needed to help us determine exactly how this parameter leads to gains in efficiency in different market contexts. We note that outcomes for experiments performed for the same markets but with different trading strategies can be different. It appears that the optimal Q s value for a given market is dependent upon the trading strategy used. Experiments with large markets populated with a large number of heterogeneous trading-agents could help us show if this indeed the case and whether nonstandard variants emerge as optimal even in these markets.
We recognize that the full potential of this idea for automatic market design can only be realized if we gain better understanding of how it works and are able to devise faster and more accurate ways of designing optimal markets with minimal risk in situations where we have only incomplete or inaccurate information. We have tried to do this by empirically studying patterns which can emerge from conducting a large number of tests over a search space of test-markets characterized by given parameters. We have shown that certain intuitions are confirmed by our experiments and the results agree with some previously known facts about the design of conventional market-mechanisms. We discover that choosing a value of Q s for a given market can be viewed as an attempt to determine to which extent buyers and sellers (as groups) take on the roles of price 'makers' and price 'takers'. This work shows that the Evolutionary Algorithms are not just optimization techniques but can be used successfully for search, exploration and knowledge discovery, especially in applications where rigorous quantitative analysis is intractable and the size of the search space is too large for exploration using conventional techniques.
Analysis of multi-player games like markets is hard. We need more insight into the relationship of the optimal Q s value with underlying market characteristics. Such research can help us in applying these ideas to real-time 'live' markets and ultimately lead to better market dynamics that can help maximize social welfare outcomes.
